The War China Might Choose
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- China could implement a "blockade by fire" — a missile strike campaign targeting Taiwan's port infrastructure — that would cripple the island's trade without attacking third-party ships, sidestepping the escalation risks of a traditional naval blockade.
- Simulations conducted by the researchers show China could reduce Taiwan's imports to 15 percent of their average peacetime level using fewer than 500 ballistic missiles launched over 100 days.
- A traditional blockade would require China to fire on commercial cargo ships to enforce it, creating discrete targets the United States and other powers could retaliate against in a limited, non-escalatory way.
- Taiwan's missile defense buildup would be a "losing strategy" because interceptor missiles cost more than the ballistic missiles they target, and defenders often need to fire multiple interceptors per incoming missile.
- Taiwan should stockpile essential supplies and port repair materials, and conduct exercises simulating port operations under attack, drawing lessons from Germany and the United Kingdom's experience with aerial attacks on port infrastructure.
- United States intervention would be harder to justify under a blockade by fire because China would not strike non-Taiwanese vessels, preserving Beijing's argument that the operation is an internal matter.
Why it matters: The analysis reframes Taiwan defense planning around an under-examined coercion strategy that exploits Taiwan's extreme trade dependence while avoiding the tripwires that would draw in the United States. Taiwan and its partners face a cost asymmetry — interceptors cost more than ballistic missiles — that makes pure missile defense financially unsustainable, forcing a shift toward port resilience, supply stockpiling, and crisis-response exercises.
