Bangladesh's China Policy Survives Three Governments
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- Tarique Rahman made Kuala Lumpur — not Beijing or New Delhi — his first overseas stop as prime minister, focusing on labor migration and trade, before traveling to China for Summer Davos and a bilateral visit in June 2026.
- Sheikh Hasina's July 2024 visit elevated Bangladesh-China ties to a Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership covering Belt and Road, infrastructure, defense, and digital economy, though Dhaka reportedly sought more financial support than Beijing ultimately offered.
- Muhammad Yunus's March 2025 visit, conducted from an interim administration after Hasina's ouster, reaffirmed rather than redefined the partnership, keeping Belt and Road cooperation, Mongla Port, and the Teesta project on the agenda.
- Rahman's 2026 communiqué introduced a proposed China-Myanmar-Bangladesh Economic Corridor (notably excluding India, reviving the stalled BCIM concept in new form), a new foreign-minister strategic dialogue, a "2+2" diplomacy-defense mechanism, and the first MOU between the BNP and the Communist Party of China.
- The Teesta River project evolved across all three visits — from water management under Hasina, to welcoming Chinese companies under Yunus, to concrete feasibility-study pledges under Rahman.
- BRICS and SCO engagement resurfaced in the 2026 communiqué with explicit Chinese backing, after being raised under Hasina but largely sidelined during the Yunus interim period.
- Bangladesh's economic focus shifted from infrastructure-led BRI projects (2024) to industrialization and manufacturing (2025) to supply chains, green energy, photovoltaic technology, and export upgrading (2026), mirroring its preparation for LDC graduation currently set for 2026, with ongoing negotiations to defer it to 2029.
Why it matters: Three very different Dhaka governments — Hasina's Awami League, the Yunus interim administration, and Rahman's BNP — have produced remarkably similar joint statements with Beijing, maintaining continuity on Belt and Road, Mongla Port, and the Teesta project through one of Bangladesh's most dramatic political transitions. Rahman institutionalizes that partnership through new dialogue mechanisms and party-level ties, while the economic agenda shifts toward supply chains and export upgrading ahead of Bangladesh's LDC graduation (2026, with deferral talks to 2029).
