China Pitches Bangladesh Corridor, Leaves India Door Open
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- China proposed an economic corridor linking its southwestern Yunnan province with Myanmar and Bangladesh during Bangladeshi Prime Minister Tarique Rahman's June visit to Beijing, with Beijing indicating the project would remain open to India and other countries
- The corridor echoes the long-discussed Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) Economic Corridor connecting Kunming, Mandalay, Dhaka, and Kolkata; the original never advanced because India refused to place it under Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative, and China-India ties deteriorated after the 2020 border clash
- The trade imbalance is stark: China supplied Bangladesh with around US$18 billion in imports in 2024–25, while Bangladesh exports less than US$1 billion annually to China; Rahman urged China to import more Bangladeshi pharmaceuticals, leather, aquatic products, and fruits
- Any overland route must cross Myanmar, in civil war since the February 2021 military coup, where the Arakan Army now controls most of Rakhine State bordering Bangladesh — the area any corridor would most likely traverse
- China's existing Myanmar corridor runs from Yunnan through Mandalay to Kyaukphyu on the Bay of Bengal, where Beijing has invested in oil and gas pipelines and a planned deep-sea port; the Bangladesh extension would deepen China's commercial footprint in the Bay of Bengal
- The proposal intersects with the nearly US$1 billion Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project in northern Bangladesh, which China recently reaffirmed support for; the project sits near India's strategically sensitive Siliguri Corridor ("Chicken's Neck") linking mainland India to its northeastern states
Why it matters: Bangladesh gains potential export access to western China but inherits exposure to Myanmar's civil war, where the Arakan Army controls Rakhine State along any overland route. For India, the proposal demonstrates that Beijing can advance regional connectivity projects without New Delhi's participation — a shift in South Asian infrastructure diplomacy after years of BRI-era deadlock.
