Growth without work: The human cost of the AI revolution

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- India's tech sector shed more than 500,000 jobs between 2022 and April 2024, including 425,000 layoffs in 2023 alone, while the former CEO of HCL Technologies warned up to 70% of IT roles could disappear.
- Anthropic's 2026 study found occupations with higher observed AI exposure are projected to grow less through 2034, and the workers most at risk are disproportionately female, more educated, and higher-paid in five of six countries studied.
- The OECD projects generative AI could add up to 6.4% to GDP in advanced economies while displacing millions of workers — a pattern economists label "growth without work," or productivity gains that do not translate into broad employment.
- Global tech layoffs in 2025 reached roughly 122,500 across 257 companies, with broader analyses indicating over 244,000 tech workers were cut worldwide, frequently with AI and automation cited as contributing factors.
- Mumbai graphic designer Kamlesh Kamtekar retrained in 3D animation after generative tools shrank the design market and was forced to drive an autorickshaw — a journey that went viral on LinkedIn.
- Aakash, a 25-year-old Bengaluru medical transcriptionist hired after a CEO assured him AI was "at least five years away," lost his contract in March 2024 as American clients shifted to automated platforms.
- The IMF's AI Preparedness Index, spanning 174 countries, shows advanced economies far outscore emerging and low-income ones on digital infrastructure, with 60% of jobs in high-income economies showing significant generative AI exposure versus 26% in low-income economies.
Why it matters: The documented displacement — 500,000-plus Indian tech workers laid off, 244,000 global tech cuts in 2025, and a projected 300 million full-time jobs erased — shows the costs of AI automation falling hardest on educated women, young workers, and the Global South while capital and productivity gains accrue to advanced economies. No policy framework in the source addresses the resulting split between output growth and employment.



