Non-State Militant Networks Reshape Global Order — SkimNews
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- Houthis supply weapons and technical training to Al-Shabaab, receiving access to piracy smuggling routes along the Somali coast in an arrangement publicly visible since at least 2024, per AFRICOM and the Financial Times
- Houthis have also armed the Islamic State in Somalia (ISS) with weapons and drones in exchange for ship-monitoring in the Gulf of Aden, and during the Gaza conflict coordinated Al-Shabaab, ISS, and Somali pirates to attack Red Sea vessels
- Sudan's civil war has drawn an estimated 150 armed groups since 2023, competing for territory, Red Sea access, and the illicit gold trade, with the Africa Center warning the conflict's "self-perpetuating drivers" are deepening
- UAE is the world's second-largest gold exporter and a major buyer of Sudanese gold — described as the "lifeblood" of the civil war per Brookings — while the RSF has received support from Russian PMCs backed by UAE and UAE-linked Colombian PMCs
- Malian government forces, backed by Russian Africa Corps, retook Kidal in October 2026 from JNIM (an al Qaeda-affiliated coalition) and the secular Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) after a six-month loss
- The global illicit economy generated around $6 trillion in 2025 according to the International Coalition Against Illicit Economies, giving criminal and militant networks growing reach across international trade and finance
Why it matters: The UAE's role as the world's second-largest gold exporter, tied to Sudan's war economy, and the limited results of 2025 US strikes in Nigeria show military pressure alone cannot break these revenue chains. The Trump administration is still searching for a framework that treats non-state actors as networks rather than isolated threats.
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