What’s next after the failure to end North Korea’s nukes program
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- Chinese readouts from the June Xi-Kim summit in Pyongyang conspicuously excluded any mention of denuclearization, signaling a shift away from Beijing's decades-long policy goal
- Watterson's survey of over 70 international nuclear weapons experts ranked North Korean denuclearization last among six hypothetical scenarios, at just a 3% probability by 2035
- North Korea now possesses an estimated 60 nuclear warheads with scalable production capability, and a missile arsenal theoretically capable of reaching the continental United States
- Russia and China withdrew support for UN sanctions by the late 2010s, using Security Council vetoes to block new resolutions and providing economic lifelines through lax border enforcement
- Russia resorted to state-sponsored sanctions violations to procure North Korean arms and soldiers for use in the war in Ukraine
- The United States avoided sanctions against Chinese targets and scaled back new designations to facilitate the first Trump administration's diplomatic outreach to Kim Jong Un
- The article argues the only realistic path to denuclearization now runs through radical political reform — regime change or reunification — and must come from within North Korea
Why it matters: The international consensus on North Korean denuclearization has functionally collapsed. With Beijing dropping it from summit language and Moscow actively breaching sanctions to buy North Korean troops for Ukraine, the practical policy posture shifts from pursuing disarmament to containment — using missile defense and sanctions enforcement to slow the program while hoping internal regime vulnerabilities create pressure for change.
