Why Eurasia, Not the Indo-Pacific, Matters Most in Next Phase of Taiwan Deterrence — SkimNews
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- Central Asia-China gas pipeline currently delivers 55 billion cubic meters per year through three lines, and a planned fourth line would raise capacity to 85 BCM; Russia's proposed Power of Siberia 2 pipeline would add another 50 BCM annually, according to the article.
- China's seaborne crude oil imports fell 32 percent to 8.1 million barrels per day in the second quarter of 2026 during the Hormuz disruption, yet strategic reserves declined only 49 million barrels (from 1.54 billion to 1.49 billion) — most of the shortfall absorbed by reduced refinery runs rather than stockpile drawdowns.
- China's National Development and Reform Commission and National Energy Administration released a new five-year plan in August calling explicitly to "consolidate and expand strategic overland import corridors" and pursue a diversified import strategy.
- The Strait of Malacca has carried 75 to 80 percent of China's seaborne oil imports since at least 2005, when Chinese Academy of Social Sciences scholar Zhang Jie linked that chokepoint to Beijing's freedom of action over Taiwan and proposed Central Asian and Russian energy routes as alternatives.
- Xi Jinping launched the Belt and Road Initiative in Astana, Kazakhstan in September 2013, declaring Central Asia a foreign policy priority, and reconvened on neighborhood diplomacy in April 2025 — days after President Trump's "Liberation Day" tariffs.
- U.S. Indo-Pacific Command has reverted to Pacific Command, a change Pentagon policy chief Elbridge Colby described as underscoring focus on the Pacific and First Island Chain; the Quad (U.S., Japan, India, Australia) has not held a leaders' summit in nearly two years.
Why it matters: China absorbed the Q2 2026 Hormuz shock — imports down 32 percent with strategic reserves declining only 49 million barrels — by cutting refinery runs rather than draining stockpiles. The data undercuts assumptions that a U.S. Malacca blockade would impose crippling pain on Beijing, which makes Pentagon strategy fixated solely on the First Island Chain strategically incomplete.
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