Russia's Tuna Role Adds Sanctions Risk for Jakarta — SkimNews
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- Russia is heavily dependent on China for trade, according to a Carnegie Endowment estimate published in September 2025: Beijing accounts for more than 30% of Russian export revenues and over 40% of imports, while Russia supplied just 3% of China’s exports and 5% of imports in 2024.
- Russia and China issued a 4 February 2022 joint statement saying stronger cooperation was neither aimed against third countries nor affected by changing international circumstances, effectively telling third states their choices would not alter the partnership.
- Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping signed a 20 May 2026 joint statement backing resolution of South China Sea disputes through negotiations among directly involved states and opposing outside regional interference; China’s foreign ministry repeated that formula in July when replying to 14 governments marking the 2016 tribunal ruling’s 10th anniversary.
- Zarubezhneft held half of the Tuna block while Harbour Energy operated it during China’s 2021 drilling standoff, yet Beijing pressed its claim and Jakarta kept the rig working until 19 November; the source uses that contrast to argue Russian ownership provided no protection.
- Harbour Energy sold its half of the Tuna block to Indonesia’s Prime Group in May 2026, while Zarubezhneft told the deputy energy minister it was ready to resume work in June; sanctions imposed after 2022 had already made financing difficult and kept the partners from a final investment decision.
- The British government added Zarubezhneft to its sanctions list on 8 October as a Russian government-affiliated entity; the source says Indonesia still needs to establish whether the listing cuts the Tuna block off from finance and insurance.
- Prabowo Subianto and Xi Jinping recorded a “common understanding on joint development in areas of overlapping claims” in their November 2024 joint statement, which Indonesia’s foreign ministry later denied meant recognition of the nine-dash line.
Why it matters: For Indonesia, the Tuna block’s Russian partner changes the practical equation: the 8 October British sanctions listing leaves finance and insurance unresolved, while a half-Russian block still drew Beijing’s 2021 drilling demand. The added Russian involvement therefore brings a sanctions burden without delivering the protection a “third pole” was supposed to provide.
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