Russia Is a Middle Power, Not a Great Power
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- Russia has a GDP only slightly bigger than South Korea's and smaller than Canada's or Brazil's, making it what the author calls a middle power with a great-power complex rather than an actual great power.
- Russia spent 7.5% of its economy (US$190 billion) on its military in 2025, while Europe's NATO members—none spending more than 4.5% of GDP—collectively spent nearly three times as much at US$559 billion.
- Russia's army has failed to overwhelm Ukraine's 880,000 active-duty personnel, with about 80% of Ukraine still in Ukrainian hands behind a largely static front line after 4.5 years of full-scale war; Moscow is now reduced to an air assault on civilians.
- Ukraine has become a world leader in drone production, and Zelensky's recent "drone diplomacy" in the Middle East culminated in ten-year deals with three countries; Ukraine also took a step forward toward EU membership this week.
- China became "the decisive enabler" of Russia's war by snapping up cheap Russian energy deserted by European or US markets, but deliberately avoided delivering weapons to Russia and never sanctioned Ukraine.
- The United States originally assumed Russia would conquer Ukraine in days, and under Trump has pulled back further, leaving a flexible coalition of democratic middle powers to carry the burden of supporting Kyiv.
Why it matters: If the war is between middle powers rather than great powers, US and China have less stake—and Europe's middle-power coalition, already out-spending Russia nearly 3-to-1 on defense ($559B vs $190B), becomes the decisive backer of a Ukraine that is simultaneously emerging as a drone and diplomatic power in its own right.
