Colby's Nuclear Doctrine Risks Calibrating the Uncontrollable — SkimNews
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- Elbridge Colby, US undersecretary of defense for policy, outlined a three-part nuclear deterrence strategy at the US Strategic Command Deterrence Symposium: strong conventional forces to deny limited aggression, credible limited nuclear options to close the gap before all-out war, and allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific taking on more conventional burden.
- Colby explicitly referenced a Taiwan scenario, framing US objectives as preventing adversaries from "crossing a body of water and sustaining operations in the face of determined resistance" rather than threatening China's destruction, and analogized the approach to the Allies winning the Battle of Britain rather than "marching on Berlin."
- Colby pointed to Ukraine's strikes deep inside Russia, including against strategic capabilities, as evidence that conflict can escalate high while remaining controlled, and extended that logic to a potential US-China conflict over Taiwan.
- The article argues US counterforce strikes on Chinese missile forces, command systems, satellites, or mainland bases would likely be read by Beijing as preparation for a disarming attack on its nuclear deterrent—not as limited, rational escalation management.
- The source warns that the more "usable" nuclear weapons become, the more adversaries will take their potential use seriously, potentially increasing pressures for pre-emption and blurring the boundary between conventional and nuclear war—undermining rather than strengthening deterrence.
- Colby's framework echoes Kennedy-era "flexible response," which General Maxwell Taylor argued was needed because Eisenhower's "massive retaliation" doctrine left presidents choosing between "humiliation or general nuclear war," and the article notes Colby's own stated doubt about whether a crisis "halfway around the world" is "worth it" for the US.
- The author, Dr Michael Clarke of Deakin University, argues that more nuclear options solve a capability credibility problem but not a commitment credibility problem—Tokyo, Seoul, Manila, and Canberra may remain unconvinced the US will risk American cities on their behalf.
Why it matters: Colby's framework assumes escalation can be precisely calibrated, but the source argues nuclear crises are shaped by "uncertainty, imperfect intelligence, organizational pressures and misperception"—making that assumption, in the author's words, "at best wishful thinking." For Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia, the doctrine also leaves unresolved whether US presidents would risk American cities to defend them, directly affecting extended deterrence credibility in both theaters.
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